State v. Fairchild Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 41549 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-14-2014
State v. Fairchild Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41549
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Fairchild Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41549" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5022.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5022
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 






JOHN JOSEPH FAIRCHILD, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) ________ ) 
NO. 41549 
KOOTENAI NO. CR 2012-14805 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
HONORABLE BENJAMIN R. SIMPSON 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #6406 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 




KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P .0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
f ,,,,, • I 1 4 ,,, ' ! // 
... ,,, \I 1.:,· i"i ' 
.! I 
'"•, / 
,,, '"' ,.,"_,,,,,_,! 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
AUTHORITI ................ ii 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................. 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................................................................... .4 
,A.RGUl\t1ENT .................................................................................................................. 5 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Fairchild's Motion 
For A New Trial ......................................................................................................... 5 
A. Introduction ................................................................................................... 5 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Fairchild's Motion 
For A New Trial ................................................................................................ 5 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 8 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................................ 9 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948) .............................. 6 
Nederv. United States, 527 U.S.1 (1999) ............................................................ 7 
Presley v. Georgia,_ U.S. 130 S.Ct. 721 (2010) ........................................... 7 
State v. Carver, 94 Idaho 677 ( 1972) .................................................................... 8 
State v. Egersdorf, 126 Idaho 684 (Ct. App. 1995) ............................................... 5 
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598 (1989) ................................................................. 5 
State v. Hom, 124 Idaho 849 (Ct. App. 1993) ....................................................... 5 
State v. Overline, 154 Idaho 2·14 (Ct. App. 2012) ................................................. 7 
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) .............................................................. 6, 7 
Statutes 
I.C. § 19-2406 ............................................................................................... 5, 6, 7 
Constitutional Provisions 
Article I, Sections 7 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution ............................................ 8 
IDAHO CONST. ART. I,§ 18 ...................................................................................... 6 
Sixth and Fourteen Amendments of the United States Constitution ...................... 8 
Rules 
I.C.R. ?(e) ............................................................................................................. 2 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
John Joseph Fairchild appeals from his judgment of conviction for grand theft, as 
well as the denial of his motion for a new trial. He asserts that the district court erred by 
denying his motion for a new trial because a portion of his trial, specifically, the 
amendment of the information following jury selection, was held without his presence 
and in chambers. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs 
On July 19, 2012, Angela Hilding was told that her "Gator," a John Deere ATV, 
was missing from her barn. (Tr., p.108, Ls.3-4.) She called the police, who arrived 
about 45 minutes later. (Tr., p.108, Ls.23-25.) 
That same morning, Kristi Jackson went out to her mother's barn; she opened 
the doors and saw a Gator, which she had never before seen in the barn. (Tr., p.117, 
Ls.10-25.) She called her mother at work and she knew nothing about the Gator. 
(Tr., p.119, Ls.11-15.) Ms. Jackson moved the Gator out of the barn and went out to 
the pasture to get her horse when she saw Mr. Fairchild and Lonnie Dahl drive up in a 
white pickup. (Tr., p.120, L.8 - p.122, L.13.) She saw them load the Gator onto the 
trailer and leave the property. (Tr., p.126, Ls.13-20.) Later that day, she went to 
Ms. Hilding's home and asked if she was missing a Gator. (Tr., p.110, Ls.4-6, p.128, 
Ls.1-7.) 
Christopher Jackson, who knew Mr. Dahl and Mr. Fairchild, confirmed that they 
came to the property. According to Mr. Jackson, Mr. Dahl and Mr. Fairchild loaded the 
Gator onto a trailer and drove away. (Tr., p.144, Ls.10-16) As they drove away, 
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Mr. Jackson saw the GatOi fall off the trailer and one of the men loaded it back up. 
(Tr., p:146, Ls.7-12.) Mr. Fairchild was charged with one count of grand theft. 
(R., p.90.) 
After the voir dire of the jurors in this case, counsel and the court met in 
chambers outside the presence of the jury, Mr. Fairchild, and the public. (Tr., p.68, L.24 
~ p.69, L.8.) Mr. Fairchild had indicated that "he is willing to waive his appearance and 
have you [defense counsel] make the decisions as it relates to the exercise of the 
peremptory challenge." (Tr., p.69, Ls.1-8.) However, after the peremptory challenges 
were made and while counsel were still in chambers, the State moved to amend the 
Information. (Tr., p.75, L.25 p.76, L.3.) The initial Information alleged that 
Mr. Fairchild wrongfully took or withheld the Gator, "with the intent to appropriate to 
himself property of another." (R., p.91.) The State sought to amend the Information to 
allege that Mr. Fairchild wrongfully took or withheld the Gator, "with the intent to deprive 
another of property or to appropriate to himself the property of another." (R., p.122; 
Tr., p.77, Ls.14-19.) Counsel for Mr. Fairchild objected on the basis that the 
amendment charged a different offense under I.C.R. 7(e). (Tr., p.80, Ls.7-20.) 
However, counsel asserted that Mr. Fairchild could not claim that he was unaware the 
charge might be amended and, "I don't claim a lot of surprise here." (Tr., p.81, Ls.5-20.) 
The court found that that the amendment did not charge a different or additional offense 
and permitted the amendment. (Tr., p.82, Ls.1-6.) 
Mr. Fairchild was convicted of grand theft, and the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of eight years, with three years fixed. (R., p.273.) He filed a motion for a new 
trial. (R., p.234.) He asserted that the district court erred by conducting proceedings 
outside of open court, erred by denying Mr. Fairchild's right to be present at trial, and 
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that the amendment was improper. (R., p.236.) In a supporting affidavit, Mr. Fairchild 
asserted that he was never advised of the amendment, did not waive his right to be 
notified of the amendment, and did not waive any right to be present at the discussion of 
any amendment. (R., p.242.) He asserted that he only waived his right to be present 
with respect to the peremptory challenges. (R., p.243.) 
The district court denied the motion, holding that there was no objection by 
counsel prejudice to Mr. Fairchild. (R., p.267; New Trial Tr., p.26, L.24 - p.27, Ls.24.) 
Mr. Fairchild appealed. (R., p.278.) He asserts that the district court erred by denying 
his motion for a new trial. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Fairchild's motion for a new trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Fairchild's Motion For A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Fairchild asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion for a new 
trial because a portion of his trial, specifically, the amendment of the information 
following jury selection, was held without his presence and in chambers. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Fairchild's Motion For A New Trial 
A decision on a motion for new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. State v. Egersdorf, 126 Idaho 684 (Ct App. 1995). When a trial court's 
discretionary decision in a criminal case is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to 
the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598 (1989). Whether a district court 
properly applies a statutory provision to the facts of a particular case is a question of law 
over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Hom, 124 Idaho 849 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
Idaho law provides that a defendant in a criminal case, after having been found 
guilty, may seek a new trial under certain limited circumstances. See I.C. § 19-2406. 
Among those circumstances are, "when the trial has been had in his absence, if the 
indictment is for a felony," and when the court has "erred in the decision of any question 
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of law arising during the course of a trial." I.C. § 19-2406(1 ); (5). Mr. Fairchild asserts 
that both of these circumstances are present here. 
The first ground raised by Mr. Fairchild's motion for a new trial was that he was 
denied a public trial because he was not present for the hearing on the motion to amend 
the Information. (R., p.236.) The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial." This right is made applicable to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 278, 68 S.Ct. 
499, 510, 92 L.Ed. 682, 696-97 (1948). Further, the Idaho Constitution provides, "courts 
of justice shail be open to every person and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury 
of person, property or character and right and justice shall be administered without sale, 
denial, delay, or prejudice." IDAHO CONST. ART. I,§ 18. 
'The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused; that the public 
may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of 
interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility 
and to the importance of their functions." Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46, 104 
(1984) (quoting Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 n. 25). "In addition to ensuring that judge and 
prosecutor carry out their duties responsibly, a public trial encourages witnesses to 
come forward and discourages perjury." Waller, 467 U.S. at 46. Waller sets forth the 
procedures that must be followed before a criminal trial may be closed over a defense 
objection: 
[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding 
interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than 
necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable 
alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate 
to support the closure. 
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Id. at 48. Because of the "great, though intangible, societal loss that flows frorn closing 
courthouse doors,·· the denial of a right to a public trial is considered a structural error 
from which prejudice is presumed. Id. at 49 n. 9. A violation of the right to a public trial 
is not subject to harmless error analysis, and a defendant need not demonstrate specific 
prejudice in order to prevail on appeal. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999). 
Excluding the public from even a portion of trial proceedings constitutes a violation of 
the Sixth Amendment right. See Presley v. Georgia,_ U.S. 130 S.Ct. 721 (2010) 
( exclusion during voir dire). 
The record in this case clearly shows that the proceedings involving peremptory 
challenges and the amendment of the Information occurred in chambers and without 
Mr. Fairchild's presence. (Tr., p.68, L.24 - p.69, L.8.) And while counsel can waive the 
defendant's right to a public trial, see State v. Overline, 154 Idaho 214, 217-18 (Ct. App. 
2012), the record discloses that the waiver in this case encompassed only the exercise 
of the peremptory challenges. (Tr., p.69, Ls.1-8.) While the court noted that no 
objection was made at the time, Mr. Fairchild raised this issue in the motion for a new 
trial, which specifically permits motions for a new trial on this basis. See I.C. § 19-
2406(1 ). Thus, Mr. Fairchild submits that the claims are preserved and that the district 
court erred. 
The district court denied the motion because Mr. Fairchild had not shown 
prejudice and that the information would have been amended with or without 
Mr. Fairchild being present. (New Trial Tr., p.26, Ls.8-25.) However, with this type of 
error, prejudice is presumed and not subject to a harmless error analysis. See Waller, 
467 U.S. at 49 n.9. Thus, the district court erred. 
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The second ground pursued in the motion for a new trial was that Mr. Fairchild's 
right to be present was violated. (R., p.239.) The right to be personally present at one's 
trial for a felony or serious offense is embodied in the Sixth and Fourteen Amendments 
of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Sections 7 and 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution. State v. Carver, 94 Idaho 677, 679 (1972). "Broadly speaking, a 
defendant's right to be present in the courtroom at each stage of his trial has been 
denominated a 'basic right' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. A violation of the right to be present is also 
not subject to harmless error analysis. See id. at 680 (holding that a violation of a right 
to be present during the empanelling of the jury is not subject to a showing of actual 
injury or prejudice, and that injury is presumed). 
Again, the district court held that Mr. Fairchild had shown no prejudice. (New 
Trial Tr., p.27, Ls.20-23.) However, as with the public trial issue, prejudice in this 
instance is presumed. Thus, Mr. Fairchild submits that the district court erred by 
denying the motion for a new trial on this basis as well. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Fairchild requests that the district court's order denying his motion for a new 
trial be reversed and his case remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this 14th day of November, 2014. 
lie Defender 
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